I'm staring at documents that make no sense to me, no matter how many beers I drink ... Apparently I have until Sept. 30 (in most instances) ... to comply with something (but what?) called "GUST" ... [for my Keogh plan and I] ... must adopt EGTRRA prior to the end of the plan year beginning in 2002. I am, frankly, reluctant to adopt anything called "EGTRRA," which sounds like the name of a giant radioactive chicken that destroys Tokyo ... the federal Tax Code is out of control ... It's gigantic and insanely complex, and it gets worse all the time. Nobody has ever read the whole thing. IRS workers are afraid to go into the same ROOM with it. They keep it locked in the basement, and once a day, they open the door, heave in a live taxpayer -some poor slob who failed to adopt EGTRRA in time to comply with GUST (and various other amendments) -then slam the door shut, before the screams start. 1 Dave Barry is right. And the private pension system is fair game for jokes and ridicule. It is absurdly complicated and incomprehensible. The relevant tax rules and regulations include more than 3,000 pages of small, single-spaced text and weigh more than most laptop computers.
The companion labor rules under ERISA are smaller but not by much. There is widespread agreement that the present situation is untenable and something must be done. Every effort to "simplify" the private pension system, however, seems to achieve just the opposite. This paper evaluates these two approaches to change -the first one for incremental and the second one for radical reform -and then considers an alternative. -3-Analyses of the private pension system typically focus on such issues as how to improve coverage or encourage saving or prevent tax abuse or generate retirement income more equitably. Those issues are important, but the thesis of this paper is that more attention needs to be paid to the structure in which they are embedded. The paper, therefore, examines the nutsand-bolts of the private pension system, the plans that comprise it and the rules that govern them.
The architecture and machinery of the private pension system have much to teach us about directions for reform.
EGTRRA, Its Origins and Aftermath
As a starting point, it is helpful to take an overview look at the private pension system today. Most people understand that the system is composed of defined benefit and defined contribution plans but few are aware that, legally speaking, there can be as much diversity within these types of plans as between them. Figure 1 illustrates the extraordinary constellation of plans that will be available under current law when EGTTRA is fully phased-in by 2006.
The private pension system evolved over time into its current complicated structure as the result of two primary factors. First, the private pension system is a tax-based system. It provides tax incentives to promote saving for retirement. Second, the private pension system is largely a voluntary employer-based system: employers are encouraged but not required to provide plans for their employees. But different types of employers are subject to different tax rules. For example, for-profit and non-for-profit employers are subject to completely different sections of the federal tax code while governmental employers are largely exempt from such rules. The theory has been that, if pension plans are to be sponsored by different types of employers, those plans should be subject to as many different rules as are necessary and appropriate for those employers.
This focus on the tax attributes of employers largely explains the historical evolution of the private pension system. It began in the 1920s with special tax rules for plans sponsored by corporate employers. Some twenty years later, new types of plans for not-for-profit employers were created. Next special plans for self-employed individuals were developed, and then rules were imposed on plans for governmental employers. With the passage of ERISA in 1974, IRAs were created, almost as an after-thought, to give workers without an employer-sponsored plan a limited opportunity to save for retirement. Finally, special "SIMPLE" plans (of which there are several cousins) have recently been created in hopes of attracting small employers to the private pension system. These are defined contribution plans with safe harbor provisions designed to reduce the regulatory requirements of sponsoring a plan to a minimum.
The post-EGTRRA system still reflects that historical evolution. There continue to be three primary families of plans. The largest group consists of defined benefit and defined contribution plans qualified under IRC § 401(a) and are subject to the full panoply of tax and ERISA rules. Although these plans were originally developed for corporate employers, now, with a few exceptions, any employer can sponsor these types of plans. The second group consists of tax-sheltered annuities that must satisfy IRC § 403(b). These plans continue to be limited to non-profit employers and public educational institutions. As might be expected, these plans are subject to much less regulation than their 401(a) counterparts. The third group consists of IRAbased plans under IRC § 408. Although IRAs were originally intended to be substitute savings plans for individuals without an employer-sponsored plan, simplified plans using IRAs have been created. They are designed to minimize the regulatory burden on employers. Finally, there are still special plans available largely to governmental employers under IRC § 457.
Although each of these families of plans was created with its own rules, there has been some convergence over time. For example, most of the special rules for plans available to the self-employed have been repealed, and IRA-based plans are now available to employers as well as employees. In addition, some of the rigid barriers between plan families have been relaxed.
Both non-profit and corporate employers may sponsor 401k plans although governmental employers may not. This convergence, however, has not resulted in much simplification because, in most respects, the plan families retain their historical structures and traditional rules. Instead, special rules and exceptions are created when the traditional rules don't fit a new situation. The result, shown in Table 1 , is a vast and complex array of rules that is increasingly difficult to navigate, even by the most experienced legal practitioner. Even if employers or individuals could "easily" adopt one type of plan or another, they often feel compelled to seek out expensive advice to walk them through the maze and try to figure out if any so-called simplified plan is indeed the best plan. The rules illustrated in Table 1 To be fair, it must be acknowledged that EGTRRA has resulted in some long overdue changes. For example, most employee savings plans -401(k), 403(b) and 457(b) plans -are now subject to the same limits on contributions, and some anomalies such as the exclusion allowance for 403(b) plans and the coordinated contribution limit for 457(b) plans have been repealed. The limits on employer contributions to defined contribution plans have also largely been rationalized. In addition, there will soon be one less plan type to worry about as the increased deduction limits for profit-sharing plans means the rapid extinction of money purchase plans. But, of course, many of these plans will continue in existence, and even the possibility of adoption adds one more source of confusion to those considering a new plan. Given this background, isn't it a good idea to allow deemed IRA contributions to be made to non-IRA plans (thereby letting employees make these contributions directly to their employer plans rather than having to maintain a separate IRA)? Isn't it at least worthwhile to allow Roth-type contributions to employee savings plans (e.g., Roth 401(k)'s in 2006)? From a legal perspective, the answer to these questions is no and no. Adding deemed IRA contributions means adding an overlay of IRA rules to plans already overwhelmed with their own rules.
Adding Roth-type contributions means adding another conflicting tax system on top of the traditional pre-tax and after-tax regimes. Both these new types of contributions mean separate vesting rules, separate distribution rules and separate record keeping and accounting requirements. EGTRRA means more, not less, legal complexity in the private pension system and imposes more, not less, of a compliance burden on employers.
EGTRRA Lays an Egg, PPSEA
According to its sponsors, PPSEA will make "the next generation of improvements to our nation's savings and pension systems" by providing "a number of important new savings tools," strengthening and expanding the employer-sponsored retirement system, offering "new protections to participants" and "assisting retirees in managing and preserving retirement assets and income". It is a massive bill with more than 200 pages and 13 lengthy sections of highlytechnical changes to employee benefits law. 2 The initial thrust of PPSEA is to accelerate and make permanent the changes in EGTRRA, now scheduled to sunset in 2010. Its immediate effect is to increase the amounts individuals could contribute to 401k-type plans and IRAs. PPSEA then winds its way through almost every aspect of the private pension system, changing, adding and deleting rules everywhere it goes. If PPSEA is enacted, the following are just a few of the major rules that will be added or changed:
• rules on vesting in defined benefit and defined contribution plans • rules on minimum required distributions • rules on rollovers and transfers between different types of plans • rules on the 10% early withdrawal tax • rules on company stock diversification • rules on plan qualification procedures • rules on negative contribution elections • rules to expand non-qualified deferred compensation plans for executives • rules to promote annuities • rules for calculating benefits under defined benefit plans • rules on investment blackout periods • rules on executive compensation for tax-exempt entities.
In addition to rule changes, there are, as always, changes to plan types. This time, the emphasis is on the special plans intended for small employers that are based on simplified designs and regulations. The proposed changes are:
• the return of salary-reduction-only plans in the form of a SIMPLE plan • the addition of more flexible matching contributions to SIMPLE 401k plans • the addition of elective employer contributions to SIMPLE plans • the creation of a "reverse match salary reduction arrangement simplified employee annuity" for small SEPs • the elimination of a higher early withdrawal tax on contributions (as opposed to returns on contributions).
None of the changes is particularly evil, and many are in fact improvements in current rules. But perhaps that's not the appropriate standard for evaluating PPSEA. The important question is not whether it does some good for some people but does it help move us toward systematic reform? Why does the private pension system need major reconstructive surgery every year or so? After every extensive legal revision, it usually takes about five years before the necessary regulatory guidance to implement the new rules is available. Too frequent changes leave plans in legal limbo and the system in regulatory gridlock.
What does PPSEA mean for the structure of the private pension system? Not much that's good when it comes to simplification; the vast number of changes represents more Depending on the plan, IRA rules will be overlaid on top of 401(a) or 403(b) or SEP or SIMPLE rules or vice versa. Each set of rules must to be satisfied but there will be so many special rules and exceptions and transition rules and historical legal quirks to navigate that compliance will be a nightmare.
Finally, giving employees options to make regular or Roth-type contributions is a nightmare. Not only does it require taxpayers to project future earnings, tax rates, and statutory changes that future Congresses might adopt, but it determines pension and budget policy in part for decades to come. What happens when a taxpayer, even assuming she can make a perfectly rational choice on the alternative offerings by the government, finds that new government rules (e.g., higher rates, lower rates, adoption of a consumption tax) means that the government reneged on what it was offering? And don't kid yourself: when eligibility for future Medicare, Medicaid, and other benefits is determined, "income" from Roth IRAs and 401(k)s should and probably will be counted, meaning that little mini-accounting systems will be required for those returns, especially if they are not listed on income tax forms because they are not taxable under the income tax itself.
Who really benefits from PPSEA? It certainly means more work for the lawyers, actuaries, consultants and accountants in the plan compliance industry, not that they need it.
New regulations will have to be drafted, plans will have to be re-written and re-qualified, and administrative procedures will have to be re-programmed. PPSEA also means more assets of higher-income individuals will need to flow through an extra layer of retirement plan management, thus increasing the fees of financial services, mutual fund, and insurance companies relative to other saving. It means that wealthier Americans can get more tax benefits from savings plans sooner (because of higher limits and liberalized withdrawal rules). And there are lots of special rules and provisions for almost every large group with an interest in pensions.
But it's hard to argue that it does anything much that's constructive for the ordinary pension consumer -the not-so-large employer and the not-so-wealthy employee -from whom the higher costs of management will take a much larger share of any saving made. No one, by the way, has made any estimate that this bill would result in any increase in the percent of low-and middleincome persons who go into retirement with, say, more than $100,000.
Are ERSAs the Answer?
In The Administration's proposals were widely criticized. Many felt that RSAs and LSAs were too generous to higher-income taxpayers. 3 Others felt that they could destabilize the private pension system because employers, particularly small business owners, would trade in their broad-based plans for personal RSAs and LSAs for themselves and their families. The
Profit-Sharing/401k Council of America, for example, expressed the opinion that some moderate and lower income employees will make smaller, or no, contributions to LSAs and RSAs than they and their employers would have made to their qualified plans. Many employees will redirect their retirement savings to LSAs and use their accumulations for non-retirement purposes. To the extent that some employers continue to offer 401(k) plans, it may be more difficult for these plans to pass the nondiscrimination tests, even as changed in the proposal. Many employees offered a 401(k) will choose instead to save in LSAs, where they will have immediate and unrestricted access to their savings. 4 The plan compliance industry was distressed that it had not been consulted and the proposals were developed without their knowledge or cooperation. As a result, the proposals failed to find supporters or receive serious consideration. would be available to all types of employers and would permit employees to make the same type of contributions available today -pre-tax and after-tax contributions. Employers could continue to make broad-based contributions as well as matching contributions. The same taxation rules on distributions would apply. For corporate employers, the special testing rules that apply to 401(k) plans would be reduced to a single test. If non-highly compensated employees contribute 6% or less of compensation, highly-compensated employees could contribute no more than twice as much. But if non-highly compensated employees contribute more than 6%, highlycompensated employees could contribute as much as they liked, up to the annual dollar limit.
But employers can avoid testing all together if they match employee contributions by 50%, up to 6% of compensation, or its equivalent. Tax-exempt employers would still be exempt from this test if their ERSAs were available to all employees, and governmental employers would continue to be exempt from any tests at all. The ability to make Roth contributions would be accelerated to 2005 (partly because the cash budget treats this as a pick-up in revenues in the short run).
Even though they are now less generous, RSAs and LSAs are likely to remain controversial. RSAs will continue to be criticized for their potential to exacerbate the intractable coverage problem in the private pension system. Even with a lower level of contributions, many employers, particularly small employers, will view RSAs and LSAs, as attractive personal substitutes for a qualified plan. With an RSA and an LSA and a non-qualified plan just for themselves and their most valued employees, they need not undertake the cost and administrative burden of a qualified plan for their employees. IDAs are an interesting addition for an underserved population but have some serious defects. It's not clear that financial institutions would be interested in the small accounts that IDAs would generate, even with the tax credit. These accounts can be expensive and difficult to market and administer so connecting them to the employer plan system in some way might make them more effective. The most important issue is whether money can be kept in the IDAs for any period of time; otherwise, the government ends up making permanent grants for no real saving.
There are merits to ERSAs that have largely been lost in the controversy over RSAs and
LSAs but the 2004 model has fewer than last year. ERSAs do help rationalize the private pension system by eliminating archaic plan types. A single plan for employee savings makes sense. But there are drawbacks as well, notably the Roth-style accounts. They represent poor budget policy by pushing all costs into the future, often for decades; they add significant complication for both planning and administration when withdrawals from traditional defined benefit plans receive more traditional tax treatment; they disfavor middle-income employees who are likely to retire and move into lower tax brackets (for whom the traditional tax treatment is better); and, as noted above, other government programs are inevitably going to require income accounting for supposedly-nontaxable Roth-style account income anyway.
A major disappointment in this year's version is the backpedaling on simplifying the nondiscrimination rules. These rules retain the devices -permitted disparity and cross-testing -that enable employers to shift more contributions to highly-compensated employees. So changing the rules for employee contributions so that highly-compensated employees can save even more with an ERSA hardly seems fair, even in the name of simplification.
A Compromise Proposal
PPSEA didn't pass in 2003 but it still seems likely to pass sometime soon. Almost every special interest group in the retirement benefit field has its most wanted provision in it, and the muscle of employee benefits and financial service trade associations is behind it. Some of its provisions do simplify. But the bill as a whole is so complicated, as is the subject matter, that it is unlikely to be scrutinized carefully. There will be no real debate over the broader issue of whether this is the proper direction for pension "reform" -a question that should be addressed soon before the cumulative weight of its complexity causes the private pension system to crumble.
Part of the problem is that PPSEA was designed in the unique 1997-2003 budget period, where almost every major tax or expenditure bill began to include give-aways without ever figuring out who would pay. Many of these bills were for good things, but no attention was paid to paying for the changes. Similarly, PPSEA gives away a lot without taking back much of anything. Any simplified rule, for instance, can not be seen as denying any benefit to anyone. If
A gets twice what B gets, the compromise is not to give A less and B more, but to try to give B at least as much as A, and perhaps add some sweetener for A. But, unfortunately, when all is said and done, the additional revenue loss was not designed, say, to maximize an increase in coverage but was simply the aggregate of all the patches. (Obviously, we are talking about longterm costs and do not play the game of counting as revenue increases taxpayer exchanges of lower taxes in the future for higher taxes today through Roth-style exchanges.)
This year, the Administration's proposals have been more favorably received. The mutual fund industry is behind it, and the plan compliance industry may come on board too.
There's even talk that the proposals, in some form, will be folded into the next version of PPSEA. Perhaps that's the most that can be expected of ERSAs. Maybe the private pension system is only capable of incremental change, and the radical reforms called for by last year's version of ERSAs will never be politically feasible.
But, if real reform were ever possible, ERSAs could be improved. Their design is appealing for its simplicity. Without adding too much complexity, they could have better coverage and discrimination standards to keep low-paid workers from being left behind or left out. Moreover, those standards should apply to all ERSAs. Keeping special rules for tax-exempt and governmental employers is an anachronism. The tax attributes of employers have no relevance for plans designed for employee savings, especially now that employee-funded plans are the primary, and often the only, source of retirement income for millions of Americans. An employee who works for a corporation should have the same opportunity to save as an employee of state government. A high-paid employee of a tax-exempt hospital should have no greater or lesser chance to save than a corporate employee with the same income. If ADP and ACP tests have succeeded in the corporate world in increasing retirement saving by low-paid employees, let's put them to work in tax-exempts and state governments too.
Another crucial reform to the ERSA proposal is to eliminate all opportunities for Rothlike contributions. As noted, they represent substantial complexity in figuring out what type of account to open, they are all back-loaded in costs and represent poor budget policy, and they add to complexity, with only one piece of that complexity related to the potential for conversions over time.
One compromise suggestion for revising ERSAs is presented in Figure 3 . This proposal was originally made five years ago when ERISA turned 25. 5 At that time it didn't seem feasible for another 25 years but, thanks to EGTRRA and the Administration's proposal, it's no longer out of the realm of possibility. Like the Administration's proposal, it calls for a single, simple defined contribution plan for employee savings to replace the many varieties available today. It also calls for uniform contribution and deduction limits and rules on portability that have largely been achieved -thanks to EGTRRA. It goes beyond the Administration proposal and beyond PPSEA to propose uniform Social Security treatment for contributions. And, unlike either, it ignores the tax attributes of employers when designing rules to promote employee saving.
It also avoids the issue over which the Administration's proposal has stumbled -overlygenerous individual savings vehicles that compete with employer plans -by calling for an individual, coordinated limit on saving between individual and employer-sponsored vehicles.
This won't solve the coverage problem; there will still be many smaller employers who will find the current IRA limits an attractive alternative to sponsoring a plan. But, unlike the Administration's RSA proposal, it will keep this plan from becoming the trojan horse of the private pension system.
Finally, it recognizes that more needs to be done than ERSA proposes to make a taxbased system an effective savings tool for low-paid workers. Without improvements in coverage, it's not clear why we want to pretend that major reform has been achieved or why we 
